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Introduction
The term desecularization strongly 
corresponds to the processes of religious revival 
in Russia; it embraces both relation between 
the state and churches and growth of religious 
feelings among majority of population. For the 
state, reapproachment with religious institutions 
is an argument for proving that Russian authorities 
completely refused from the soviet ideology that 
included atheism as an indispensable condition. 
Simultaneously, the state lays hopes on religion 
in the questions of improving sociocultural 
climate: “Our country… can find moral principles 
in religious values only. Our people, the citizens 
of the Russian Federation have got some moral 
foundation and footing, which is essential for the 
stability of society, for the future of the state and 
every person” (Shorthand report, 2012). 
Looking at the strong state support to 
officially recognized religions (not only Russian 
Orthodoxy but also Islam and Buddhism, and in 
Buryatia the Russian Old Belief also), we can 
conclude that realization of freedom of belief – one 
of democratic freedoms – really takes place and the 
multiethnic population of Russia can choose their 
religious identity, follow the religious traditions, 
or not to believe. Moreover, desecularization 
has become a national project aimed at restoring 
some of the social functions of religion – first of 
all, the functions of social control and regulation 
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in the secularized society that implies separation 
of religious sphere from the worldly practices. 
In this connection the question arises: whether 
religion is in state to fulfill the function of social 
regulation in the society, in which the basic 
worldview function of religion characterizes 
neither individual nor mass consciousness? 
Another and no less important question concerns 
the correlation between religiosity and religious 
belief: how religiosity as a phenomenon that is 
quite amenable to sociological dimensions can 
reflect extremely personal sentiments concerning 
belief in divine power, God’s trade and reliability 
of religious dogma?
To answer these and other questions we can 
on the example of contemporary Buryatia that 
gives us opportunity to study on local materials 
the desecularization process in a particular ethnic 
group and extrapolate the results on post soviet 
space in whole.
Materials and Methods
In my paper, I employ field materials of 
my own including questioning, qualitative 
interviewing, observation and participation 
in religious rituals and worshipping, as well 
as archives and mass media materials. Also I 
used sociological and statistical data gathered 
and published by other researchers and official 
institutions. 
The research applies the methodology 
of religious functions proposed by Emile 
Durkheim (Durkheim, 1964) and the principles 
of social constructivism (Berger, Luckmann, 
1966; Bloor, 1976; Barnes, 1977; Connor, 1994). 
Actualization of social functions of religion 
in the desecularization processes flows from 
providing religious practices with the qualities 
that are characteristic for the worldly life: “And 
the fact that it is society alone which is the author 
of these varieties of apotheosis, is evident since 
it frequently chances to consecrate men thus 
who have no right to it from their own merit. 
The simple deference inspired by men invested 
with high social functions is not different in 
nature from religious respect. It is expressed by 
the same movements: a man keeps at a distance 
from a high personage; he approaches him only 
with precautions; in conversing with him, he uses 
other gestures and language than those used with 
ordinary mortals. Thus the moral power conferred 
by opinion and that with which sacred beings are 
invested are at bottom of a single origin and made 
up of the same elements” (Durkheim, 1964: 213). 
Thus, in full correspondence with E. Durkheim’s 
ideas, I propose to approach to the desecularization 
processes in Russia from functional positions that 
prove to give a best instrumental set for studying 
religiosity in various measurements and aspects. 
Validity of Durkheim’s idea is confirmed with 
political strategy in Russia where strengthening 
of religious identity implies social stability, or, 
according to Durkheim’s principles, promotes 
social cohesion and stability that bring to loyalty 
to the state. 
The methodological principle proposed by 
P. Berger sounds like this: “My point is that the 
assumption that we live in a secularized world is 
false. The world today, with some exceptions… 
is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in 
some places more so than ever…. To be sure, 
modernization has had some secularizing effects, 
more in some places than in others. But it had 
also provoked powerful movements of counter-
secularization. Also, secularization on the societal 
level is not necessarily linked to secularization 
on the level of individual consciousness 
(Berger, 1999: 2-3). P. Berger’s sharp refusal 
from his previous views on correlation between 
modernization and secularization appears to be 
productive regarding post soviet transformations 
when after decades of peripheral place of religion 
in social practices, Russian society rushed 
into deep concern about religious values and 
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spirituality. For example in Buryatia, within the 
last twenty five years the number of people who 
recognize themselves as believers has increased 
from approximately 5% (Kruchkov, Mikhailov, 
1987: 45-46) to almost 100% at present. It is 
worth marking that while during the soviets the 
so called religious ‘survivals’ were characteristic 
mainly for the villagers, at present the city 
dwellers show definitely higher percentage of 
believers (Budaeva et al., 2010: 47-49).
Results
In the USSR, the highest permission to 
express religious fillings was given in late 1980-
es. Despite Perestroika, it was the time when most 
of soviet citizens, though in word only, declared 
their atheism or indifference to religious issues 
and the population of Buryatia was not exclusion. 
At present, the situation changed completely: most 
of Buryats definitely say that they are Buddhists, 
with steadily increasing figures from 61, 2 % in 
1999 to 70 % in 2011. 
One of the specialists in sociology of religion, 
Georgy Manzanov, thinks that the reason for 
religious revival lies in disintegration of the 
USSR, in the system crisis of Russian economy 
and in poverty, which became characteristic 
for the most of the population. He says that 
in religion people are looking for support and 
consolation (Manzanov, 2012: 134). In reality 
it would be naïve to explain the situation in the 
Marxist terms. It is more productive to agree with 
Berger’s desecularization theory and admit that 
believe in supreme power never left individual 
minding even during the soviets, though it was 
not religiosity within a definite religious system. 
The nowadays situation is similar to that during 
the soviets: before it was dangerous to speak 
about one’s religiosity, and now it is unprofitable 
to speak about indifference to religion. 
Simultaneously, there are some serious 
doubts about the hidden religiosity during the 
soviets. First of all, let us remember that the first 
post totalitarian polls on religiosity did not reveal 
considerable growth of believers. But beginning 
from early and especially middle of 1990-es the 
number of atheists has become close to the number 
of believers in the USSR and continues to reduce. 
In this concern it would be reasonable to mark 
that religious worldview could not occupy the 
positions it had in the traditional society and thus 
the issue of special interest concerns changing in 
the social functions of religion. We can hardly say 
that within late twenty five years the basic world 
view and compensatory functions of religion have 
occupied dominant place in public consciousness; 
however persuasive ideological advertizing of 
religion and constant appeal to religion as the 
most important component of culture inevitably 
construct collective and individual cultural 
values. Thus it becomes a good form-style to be 
a believer at least because religion is considered 
as a component of patriotism in different senses 
similarly as atheism was a part of soviet patriotism 
and loyalty. 
Religion takes on the function of a marker 
for social identification at a time when Russia as 
a whole has been transformed into a rationalized 
and secularized society. In comparison to a 
traditional society, religious belonging at present 
plays mostly a symbolical role in the ascription 
to a community. Thus, the actual revival of 
religiousness takes a considerably smaller place 
in the life of an individual than the nominal 
belonging to a religious community; when 
declaring his/her religious creed, a person draws 
a parallel between the religious and the politico-
cultural community. 
In the discourse about the Buryat national 
revival, it is not so much the institutionalized 
religion, i.e. institutions and practices of Buddhism 
and Shamanism that matters but the predominant 
idea of space modeled after symbolical and sacral 
concepts. It is irrelevant whether these symbolic 
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representations are traditionally inherent to 
the religion or newly acquired. Therefore the 
declaration of one’s religious denomination serves 
as one of the principle signifiers of the national 
image and, secondly, as a means of symbolical 
communication. In this sense, for an ordinary 
person identifying him or herself by ethnicity, 
religion is a primary marker of ethnic boundary 
in any given sense, from the socio-cultural to the 
political. 
On the other hand, due to the fundamental 
change in the relationship between the state and 
religion, religious institutions have undergone 
an essential modernization. This concerns 
practically every aspect of their activities, from 
the narrow confessional, i.e. world-view concepts, 
ritual, educational and institutional aspects to 
the participation in politics, everyday life and 
international affairs. 
Thus, religious revival in Buryatia needs to 
be considered simultaneously on two levels: the 
revival of religiousness and the substantial change 
of the social function of religion. There exists a 
high interdependence between these levels that 
is established and developed through a constant 
exchange between the nominally believing 
public and the leaders, among which, at first 
sight paradoxically, the most active promulgators 
of religious revival are not the clergy, but the 
intellectual and political elite. 
Within the last twenty years, Buryat 
national ideology has undergone a substantial 
transformation from the inculcation of the 
concept of the birthright to the land, i.e. militant 
secessionist and irredentist ethnonationalism, to 
the present-day propaganda to preserve ethnic 
cultural traditions. Religion is considered to be 
the most stable and universal element of Buryat 
culture, and therefore in the public understanding 
Buddhism and Shamanism have taken a role as 
religions, which are ethnic space markers as well 
as national symbols – the national religion. 
Notably in the last years the discourse on 
national identity, both in the scientific literature 
and in the mass-media, has emphasized the 
national character of Buddhism and Shamanism, 
despite their obvious distinctions, and has 
attributed to them a unity of world-outlook and 
conceptual apparatus, brought about by using 
the terms and categories of Buddhist religious-
philosophical thought. Moreover, in the discourse, 
Buddhism and Shamanism have become 
synonyms for the ethno-national culture. The 
components of this culture, notably the traditional 
world-outlook, the folklore, the spirituality, and 
other features of an ostensibly national character 
(tolerance, responsiveness, hospitality, aspiration 
to knowledge, etc.) are exclusively explained by 
religious values.
Despite the decrease in ethno-political 
mobilization in Buryatia since 2000, religion as a 
marker of cultural boundary has become one of the 
main arguments in the discourse about political 
identity: “the people of Buryatia” in the sense 
of a fellow-citizenship1 solely denotes the fact of 
joint residence in the same territory. Though the 
peaceful character of this joint residence is very 
often emphasized, nevertheless the boundaries 
between the ethno-cultural components of such 
a community appear to be much more important 
than the common historical destiny. Therefore, the 
newly created community of a “Buryat nation” – 
an ethno-nation – is capable of producing more 
emotions and empathy than the well-known 
and recognized but featureless and amorphous 
category “people of Buryatia” does. 
Buddhism and Shamanism (which in 
public understanding appear most often as 
indistinguishable entities) are considered as 
instruments of ethnic integration and as symbols 
of ethnic belonging, irrespective of the individual 
depth of belief and knowledge (if at all existent) 
of their religious mythologies and dogmas. This 
conclusion can be drawn from the results of 
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sociological inquiries in which the respondents 
(persons with higher education) answered the 
question “What in your opinion is first of all 
associated with the concept of our Buryat people?” 
44.4 percent of the respondents chose the answer 
“our religion”, whereas only 22.2 percent chose 
the answer “the state, in which I live” (Biltrikova, 
2001: 75). 
However, it is notable that under the present-
day condition of religious freedom and the 
ongoing politicization of religious belonging, 
the overwhelming majority of Buryats describe 
themselves as belonging to the Buddhist religious 
community: while in 1990-es nearly half of 
the respondents simply believed in God and 
supernatural forces (Biltrikova, 2001: 74), in 2011 
only 1, 1 % chose the answer “I believe in my 
own God and do not care what is my religious 
creed” (Manzanov, 2012: 134). Nevertheless, any 
attempt to reveal what is the essence of personal 
religiosity shows that religiosity is not Buddhist 
in strict terms. The cultural interdependence 
(the coexistence of Buddhism, Shamanism, and 
Russian Orthodoxy in Buryatia) and dominance 
of Russian culture inevitably brought to 
Christianization of ordinary consciousness. Of 
course, ideas about moral behavior and retribution 
in Buddhism and Christianity can’t be strictly 
divided; but simultaneously, against universal 
religious ignorance, the majority of people, 
especially young, show acquaintance, though 
weak, to Christian mythology about origin of 
the universe and people or about soteriology. 
Hence, in the people’s syncretistic religious 
understanding the very fact of belief is much 
more important than religious dogma. 
Simultaneously, the emphasis on the 
religious component of culture in the discourse 
of ethnic identity promoted a growing interest 
in the rituals: in 2011 the number of those who 
participated in religious rituals was 69, 8% 
(Manzanov, 2012: 134). In addition, sociological 
research has brought to light that many educated 
people who call themselves Buddhists, want to 
obtain a better knowledge about the history of 
Buddhism and its philosophy. Therefore literature 
on Buddhism, publications in the mass media, and 
in an even higher degree the various teachings 
of Buddhist lamas, especially Tibetan, are very 
popular among intellectuals. Moreover, Buddhist 
advanced philosophy and enormous global 
importance suggest that a person who declares 
him/herself a Buddhist must possess a high 
intellectual ability and morality. Nevertheless, the 
eastern (Transbaikalian) Buryats are confident 
that Buddhism is their native religion while 
they consider the western (pre-Baikal) Buryats 
to be shamanists by birth because historically 
Buddhism did not occupy prominent position 
in those territories. Nowadays, however, the 
majority of Buryats, irrespective of their regional 
origin, declare themselves Buddhists. Moreover, 
in recent years the idea that Buddhism is a kind of 
“genetic accessory” of all Buryats has taken root 
in public discourse.2 
Due to the ethno-national revival, 
Buddhism has acquired a quality, which was 
not characteristic to it within the framework of 
traditional Buryat society: the ability to fulfill a 
function of wide social modeling and integration. 
This essentially new quality of the Buddhist 
religion serves various functions, enforcing a 
particular ethno-identity understood in various 
senses. First, Buddhism as the national religion of 
all Buryats becomes the core of the national idea 
in its political aspect because the preservation of 
the national values is identified solely with the 
Buryat statehood. Secondly, the Buddhist revival 
is considered as one of the principal components 
in the return to the historical, political, and 
cultural memory and roots. Theoretically, this 
excludes the Buryats from the existing Russian 
community and attributes them to a different 
historical and cultural commonness, such as the 
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All-Mongolian and Central-Asian community. 
In the most global sense, the territorial space of 
such a community is called the `world Buddhist 
civilization’ and the Buryats have obtained a most 
worthy place in this space as a people living on 
sacred territory. Thirdly, at the present time when 
socialist reference points disappeared, Buddhism 
becomes a moral imperative and the driving force 
behind the moral education of the Buryats in a 
spirit of compassion, contemplation and aversion 
of a bad influence on the part of Russia and the 
West. One can compare this topic of the Buryat 
discourse with the ever more extending role of 
Orthodoxy in the socio-cultural discourse of the 
Russian ethno-cultural majority in Russia.
In my opinion, for the current period in 
the history of Buryatia, the Buryat nationalist 
project has already been completed. At the 
same time, despite the elite’s far from complete 
realization of programs on ethno-cultural 
revival, ordinary citizens seem to feel a residual 
sensation of participation in ethno-politics, 
which in their latent form include both ethnic 
and religious components. The reason for this 
latent politicization lies in the fact that since 
Perestroika and down to the most recent past, 
due to ethnic mobilization, paradigms about 
ethnic community have shaped Buryat public 
and individual discourse. Thus, a modern ethnic 
cosmology was formed, which, being based on 
the idea of cultural sovereignty, is nothing more 
then the transformed and depoliticized idea of 
political sovereignty. Moreover, the political 
element (political sovereignty in its specific 
Russian connotation) has by now become a 
constant, and ethnicity that is still topical, 
concerns mainly the qualitative filling of the 
ethnic cultural space. 
In Russia and Buryatia lay people seem 
to agree that modern life forces the religious 
institutions to adapt to change. Therefore, the 
participation of the clergy in politics, especially 
at the all-Russia level, does not meet with 
disapproval, on the contrary: the political 
commitment of clerics is considered evidence 
to the increasing role and importance of the 
Buryats in the Russian state. At the same time, 
however, common Buddhists are not apt to accept 
religious innovations which obviously contradict 
the aspiration of higher spirituality. This is also 
a question of the increasing diversity of the 
previously indivisible Buddhist community, 
which led to conflicting public claims of the 
Buddhist leaders and even to mutual insults. It 
is obvious to the believers that such behavior has 
nothing to do with religious belief and dogma 
but is aimed at the seizure of spiritual territory 
and the acquisition of the ‘flock’. The problem 
is closely connected with the commercialization 
of Buddhist practices that in the opinion of 
parishioners is also incompatible with the true 
Buddhist belief.3 
In my opinion, the revived Buryat Buddhist 
institutions present the brightest evidence for 
the successful construction of a Buryat cultural 
Ethnosphere (see for details (Amogolonova, 
2008)). They obtain an increasing importance in 
various aspects of daily spiritual life including 
both religious and worldly practices. People resort 
to the authority of the Buddhist clergy when the 
strategies of district or area development are 
under discussion, when people face personal and 
family troubles, and even when artistic shows 
or sports competitions take place. For example, 
Buddhist lamas enthusiastically supported the 
idea of developing tourist-recreational zones in 
Buryatia, taking into consideration the problems 
of spiritual keeping and that the cultural 
traditions are the Republic’s brand. At the All-
Russia scientific-practical conference in Ulan-
Ude which was devoted to the exposition of a 
“regional brand”, the participants concluded that 
Buddhism and Russian Old Belief must become 
the trump card of Buryatia.4 
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In this way Buddhism alongside its role 
as a major spiritual value becomes a part of the 
image of Buryatia and the Buryats. Buddhism 
is transformed into a consumer good as rare and 
exotic bait for tourists. In both world-views, the 
traditional one and the modern market oriented, 
we note the construction of an extraordinary – 
sacral, wonderful and even magic – spatial 
continuum through symbols of spiritual 
continuity, thus stressing the spiritual aspects of 
the Buryat cultural and socio-political history. 
Neither now, no in the recent past, despite 
the active participation of the Buddhist clergy in 
political activities (membership in political parties 
and the elective government bodies), in Buryatia 
there is no explicit politicization of Buddhism 
in the sense of support for the nationalist (either 
secessionist or irredentist) propaganda of the elite.5 
On the contrary, institutionalized Buddhism – the 
Traditional Buddhist Sangha of Russia – quite 
well meets the requirements demanded from 
the state religions. These requirements consist, 
in particular, in a protective function, i.e. the 
support of legal power and the counteraction 
to any attempt to change the political and 
social conditions. In this sense, Hambo Lama 
Ayusheev’s public work is rather characteristic 
because he personifies a traditional for Buddhist 
clergy alliance between the Buddhist institutions 
and the Russian authorities. He actively advertises 
the indissoluble ties between Buddhist religious 
leaders and the Russian authorities by means 
of his personal participation in all possible for 
his rank councils and committees including the 
Public Chamber for the President of the Russian 
Federation. 
In this connection it’s necessary to say some 
words about Hambo Lama Ayusheev’s activities 
as the spiritual leader of Buryats. Having become 
a head of the Buddhist church at young age when 
he was 32, he immediately showed himself to be 
a first-rate organizer. Numerous examples of his 
participation in republic’s and all-Russia affairs 
both religious and secular are the evidences of 
his tireless expression of loyalty to the Russian 
state. Rumors about his desire to proclaim 
Dmitry Medvedev (when he was the President of 
Russia) an incarnation of White Tara didn’t prove 
to be true, however had some basis, as Ayusheev 
repeatedly says that since times of Catherine II, 
in Buddhist tradition in Buryatia, the tsars have 
been considered the incarnations of this goddess. 
In addition, he laid a bubma – a sacred ritual 
vessel – on a place of the subsequent construction 
of dugan devoted to White Tara, the patroness of 
Russia’s rulers. 
But Ayusheev’s contribution to the Buryat 
ethno-national ideology is more interesting. In the 
field of economics, he gives sheep and foals of the 
Buryat breed to the villagers in order to restore 
traditional nomadic stock-breeding and way 
of life; he supports traditional sports: platform 
for wrestling and stands have been constructed 
immediately by the gates of the Ivolga datsan.
His activities are more stunning in the 
sphere of organizational strengthening of 
Buddhist church in Russia. He is a tireless and 
persistent initiator of autocephaly declaring 
that Buddhism in Buryatia is independent from 
Tibetan and Mongolian tradition. He says that 
Buryats received Buddhism from Damba-Dorzhi 
Zayaev – the first Hambo Lama, and he in his first 
birth received it from the Buddha Kasyapa and in 
the second birth – from the Buddha Sakyamuni 
(Mahachkeev, 2010: 164). So, Ayusheev says, 
Buryats should not feel themselves as people 
of second-rate if compared to Tibetans and 
Mongols because in reality Buryat Buddhism is 
an independent direction of Northern Buddhism.
In his autocephalic expectations he 
persistently speaks about necessity to transfer 
the religious services into the Buryat language 
because even lamas can not understand old-
Tibetan properly and ordinary parishioners would 
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of course prefer sermons in Buryat. This rule, he 
says, was first introduced in 1923 and by now it 
was not cancelled. By the way, he says that he 
himself began the hard work on translation of the 
Tibetan texts into Buryat. 
One more Ayusheev’s special position 
concerns Lamahood. Laymen are deeply 
concerned whether lamas must adhere to 
celibacy and chastity as it is demanded in vinaya 
rules. One of them – brahmacarya vow – means 
that monks can not marry and have children. 
Damba Ayusheev says that monasticism is not a 
compulsory condition for the lamas. It is of less 
importance than compassion and help to people 
in religious and everyday life. 
Buryat autocephaly in Damba Ayusheev’s 
ideas has a deep political context as he often says 
that the institute of Dalai Lamas in the modern 
conditions will be inevitably cinocized, and it 
is better to take care beforehand that China had 
no great influence on Russian Buddhists in the 
future. These ideas that come from the head of 
the biggest Buddhist community in Russia can be, 
with some reservations, considered as elements 
of religious reformation, an immanent condition 
of modernization. As for the reservations, they 
are serious enough and concern, first, little 
interest of the believers in such innovations, 
especially among Kalmyks and Tuvinians. 
Another reservation concerns Damba Ayusheev’s 
personality. Being deeply esteemed as Hambo 
Lama, he is nevertheless skeptically estimated 
as an official: people dislike his servility 
towards the state leaders and his ambitiousness. 
Simultaneously, people approve that he managed 
to put himself as the Master of the Republic as 
he seems to be superior to the ruling elite when 
meeting and talk to them.
What definitely plays for Damba Ayusheev 
is strengthening of the Traditional Sangha. In 
reality, the events in the Buddhist church in 
Buryatia in 1990-es were a reflection of the 
situation in Russia: multiplication of Buddhist 
community and centrifugal tendencies that 
resulted in numerous autonomous Buddhist 
communities was similar to the whole political 
situation in Russia. The vertical of power carried 
out by Vladimir Putin found its reflection in 
the Buddhist community: now the Traditional 
Sangha undoubtedly occupies the strongest 
positions among Buddhists in Russia and is the 
only Buddhist organization that is considered by 
the Russian authorities. 
A decisive role in this strengthening was 
played by the miracle of Hambo Lama Itigelov. 
Beginning from his Return in 2002, which is 
inexplicable from a scientific point of view, the 
Itigelov’s phenomenon occupies central position 
in the Buddhist revival in Buryatia. The obvious 
lack of a satisfactory rational explanation of the 
phenomenon endorses the point of view, which 
claims that an explanation of the phenomenon 
of Itigelov can be found only and exclusively in 
the context of Buddhist religion and philosophy. 
In particular, this idea was expressed by the 14th 
Dalai Lama: “Many Buddhist monks learn about 
death whilst dying during meditation and thus 
release themselves from earthly existence. They 
can meditate for decades while their bodies do not 
decay. The meditating lama in Buryatia whose 
body is imperishable for already 75 years gives an 
example for this” (quoted from (Chimotdorzhin, 
2004:101)).
Hambo Lama Ayusheev sceptically 
acknowledges the huge stream of people wishing 
to see and touch Itigelov: “People were not ready 
for the return of Itigelov… The overwhelming 
majority of people come to Itigelov to solve 
their personal problems” (quoted from (Budaev, 
2007: 8)). Ayusheev believes that laymen should 
less aspire to blessing or help and more a change 
of attitude towards life. However, it is beyond 
doubt that the miracle of Itigelov’s return not 
only helped to increase the number of pilgrims 
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to Ivolga datsan; in many respects, thanks to the 
broad discussion of the phenomenon of Itigelov 
in the mass media, concepts of Buddhist religion 
and philosophy (karma, moksha, samadhi, etc.) 
found their way into the vocabulary of everyday 
language. Those laymen who are interested in 
philosophical substantiations of the miracle 
receive explanations from lamas; some of the 
latter willingly publish papers on this topic in 
scientific journals. 
It is no coincidence that the number of those 
who avow themselves to be faithful Buddhists has 
considerably increased since 2002 (for details, 
see (Amogolonova, 2009: 267–268)). Certainly, 
we still deal with nominal religiousness and 
conventional belief; but the desecularization 
process of the public sphere takes place 
nonetheless. In this context, it is worth noting 
that Itigelov’s belonging to the Buryat ethnic 
community promotes strengthening feelings of 
ethnonational exclusivity and the construction 
of a Buryat self-image and identity. With full 
confidence we can say that the phenomenon 
of Itigelov appears to be a major symbolic 
momentum of the contemporary Buryat ethno-
national revival. 
Buddhism that is considered as a principle 
characteristic of Buryats and the only integrating 
force (no matter how deep is faith and knowledge 
about its doctrines) ensures notable role of 
Buryats in Russia and in the global scale. Even 
depoliticized, Buryat Ethnosphere is ideologically 
related to Buryat ethnonationalism – the feedback 
between the former leaders and present-day social 
mentality consists in uncritical taking on trust a 
postulate about common fate and ethnic values. 
Thus, such a feedback concerns not only national 
identity and the desecularization in the public 
sphere. Implicitly it promotes the Buryat national 
idea, which has essentially faded after Vladimir 
Putin’s coming into power, when thinking ethno-
nationally was out of political fashion. The 
exclusiveness of Itigelov’s miracle has inspired 
the Buryat national idea, as it confirms the 
extraordinary role of Buryats in Russia. 
The fact that the miracle happened in 
Buryatia attests to the reality of the Buryat 
Buddhist revival. Simultaneously, it has become 
a central momentum in the actualization of the 
discourse on the improvement of the republic’s 
image and on solutions to its economic problems. 
This is a practical aspect of the phenomenon of 
Itigelov.
The Republic of Buryatia is one of the most 
troubled regions of Russia. Economic problems 
in industry and agriculture have essentially 
aggravated the development of the region during 
the post soviet period. Having submitted a 
program to develop tourist-recreational zones in 
the Republic, a few years ago the Buryat legislative 
and executive powers won a competition for 
governmental support regarding the creation of 
large recreational areas around Lake Baikal and 
in other territories. However, nothing notable 
resulted out of this: The absence of infrastructure 
and initiatives as well as the severe climate 
appear to be insuperable obstacles to solutions 
of the tourist industry to Buryatia’s economic 
problems. But the mass media continue to discuss 
the search for a unique and attractive brand for 
Buryatia. Along with Lake Baikal and various 
other natural features, intellectuals recommend 
the consideration of Buryat traditional culture 
(Buddhism and Shamanism) and the intercultural 
interaction of the different Transbaikalian ethno-
cultural groups as a brand.
After Itigelov’s ‘Return’ the discussions 
have become more brisk and purposeful. The core 
issue of this discourse has nothing to do with the 
spiritual aspect of the phenomenon but deals with 
its practical side, namely “the Buryat miracle” 
as national property of Russia that is included in 
the informal rating of the world famous brands. 
The same topic is actively discussed on the 
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website of the Forum of the Buryat Nation: “Our 
republic is now talked about as a land where a 
real miracle happened” (Forum, 2007). Because 
of the indefatigable interest in the phenomenon 
of Itigelov, the inclusion of Itigelov as the main 
feature in the list of tourist attractions of Buryatia 
is being formulated as a priority, mainly because 
other features, including Lake Baikal, do not 
possess such uniqueness – a criterion essential 
to the successful tourism that Buryatia aspires. 
Meanwhile, the information confirmed by lamas 
that Itigelov renders real help to everyone who 
comes to him finds ‘convincing proof’ in the 
mass media. 
Conclusion 
Neither Itigilov’s miracle nor numerous 
datsans and lamas can promote overcoming of 
a deep gap between banal religiosity and true 
religious belief. The pragmatic attitude to religion 
certainly wins over desire to understand Buddhist 
Dharma. People willingly name themselves the 
Buddhists but their religious practice is mainly 
just in case – they address to spirits-ancestors or 
Buddhist deities in hope to receive benefits. A 
propos, numerous pilgrims to the Imperishable 
Body have the same goal – to wheedle benefits 
for themselves and their family. For this purpose 
people are ready to give donations. The Dalai 
Lama when addressing to the Buryat Buddhists 
said noteworthy words: “we, the representatives 
of the Buddhist communities do not pay attention 
to the foundations of the Buddhist Dharma. We 
simply limit ourselves to praying and cultivating 
of faith. Thus performing of rituals becomes a 
simple tribute to the tradition. People come to the 
monks with donations and that is all. It should 
not be like this! People need inner values” (Dalai 
Lama’s Address, 2011: 1). 
Returning of religiosity in its traditional 
form is hardly possible in the modernized 
society that is nowadays Russia. The question is 
different: Buddhist religion as any other religion 
being an important phenomenon of culture 
possesses tremendous psychological and ethical 
potentials that could improve the situation 
of mutual intolerance and mistrust that is so 
characteristic for modern Russia. The question 
is whether for this it is necessary to revive the 
basic worldview functions of religion or this 
is achievable in the conditions of secularized 
public consciousness? 
1 The Constitution of the Republic of Buryatia proclaims the existence of the “multinational people of Buryatia that in the 
course of historical development has united the Buryats, Russians, Evenks, and citizens of other nationalities”.
2 For example, the journalist M. Saidukova writes that most Buddhists in Buryatia are Buddhists by birth [Saidukova, 
2006: 11].
3 Hambo Lama Damba Ayusheev openly approves of the commercial activity of clerics: “A Datsan is nothing more then an 
airport, in which the dugans, suburgans and other cult constructions are the alarm beacons. <…> During the service the 
lamas invite gods to go down on their air liners to them on the land and to render the feasible help to each believer who is 
taking part in the service. And here the lamas play a role of avia dispatchers. However, the service ends, and the invited 
visitors-inhabitants of Heaven take their liners and depart for home. <…> In this case, the believers are the sponsors who 
pay for gasoline” [Rain of Flowers, 2005: 26].
4 Shevchenko, 2008: 1.
5 Clerics acting outside institutionalized Buddhism sometimes express their negative opinion on the union of the Buryat 
districts with the Irkutsk and Chita regions that has already become a fact. As the well-known teacher of Buddhist philoso-
phy who became a layman (i.e. he renounced his Buddhist vows and titles including the Geshe title) Jumpa Tinley states: 
“The integration of the regions will interfere with the spiritual development of Buryatia. The disappearance of the unique 
and original Buryat culture will become a tragedy not only for Russia but also for the whole world. Before making any 
decision, the government should be interested not only in the material aspect but also in the spiritual life of people. I am a 
citizen of Russia; therefore I can allow myself to express my views on the given question” [Uchitel 2005: 1].
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Буддийское возрождение  
в контексте процессов десекуляризации  
в современной России  
(на материалах Республики Бурятия)
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В статье исследуются процессы десекуляризации общественного сознания в общем 
контексте религиозного возрождения в России. Основываясь на функциональном подходе, 
автор выделяет и анализирует наиболее значимые характеристики религиозности 
с учетом этнокультурного измерения. Одновременно автор исследует соотношение 
между возрождением мировоззренческих оснований религии и банальной религиозностью, 
конструирующей этнокультурную дифференциацию.
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